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Drydocks: End of a Saga? 
Saviour Rizzo 
The Setting 
Throughout its colonial history, Malta has been ruled by a 
succession of powers that tried to exploit its strategic position in 
the middle of the Mediterranean. To the inhabitants of an island 
that lacks any exploitable natural resources, being subjected to 
the rule of a foreign power seemed to be fore-ordained. This fostered 
a culture of fatalism and a sense of powerlessness among the Maltese 
since their destiny was tied to the designs and policies of the colonial 
power governing the island (Zammit, 1984). 
Being a naval power, the British (1800-1964) developed a naval 
dockyard during their rule and improved the berthing facilities of 
the island's main harbour. This investment, together with the 
presence of the military and air force personnel, provided a source 
of livelihood to a sizeable number of the Maltese population. 
However, this livelihood was regularly threatened whenever the 
British Government was forced to cut expenditure in stringent 
economic times. Following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
in 1956 by the Egyptian Government, the British Government 
announced drastic reductions in its annual financial vote to Malta 
and even threatened to close down the Dockyard which at that 
time employed about 10% of the Maltese labour force. Once Britain 
was losing its starus as a super power the vulnerability of the Maltese 
economy was becoming very precarious. 
In 1959, the first development plan was launched to diversify 
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the island's economy and make it less dependent on the largesse of 
the British Exchequer. With the attainment of independence in 
1964, this drive towards economic diversification was stepped up 
with the development of the tourist industry and expansion of the 
manufacturing sector. Though registering sustainable growth, the 
Maltese economy was however still dependent on the sum of money 
which Britain agreed to pay for the use of its base in Malta and on 
the employment of many Maltese workers with the British services 
stationed on the island. 
The main objectives of the newly elected Labour Government in 
1971 was to obliterate this fortress status and render Malta's 
economy dependent on productive work. To accomplish this task 
of achieving self-reliance it pledged itself that, while seeking new 
directions in the economic field, it would concurrently adopt a 
new form of industrial relations. In its endeavour to create this 
form of labour relationship, the Government engaged itself: 
" ... in a search process for the establishment of a new social 
basis of authority relations, one that should replace the old 
power structure based on economic dependence and the 
pursuit of economic gains which had manifestly broken down" 
(Zammit et al., 1982, p. 6). 
In this search exercise, workers' participation featured 
prominently. Indeed, in the restructuring exercise of the 1970's, 
workers' participation was earmarked to playa leading role in the 
objectives set by Government to achieve self-reliance. 
With its traditional highly unionised and militant workforce, 
Malta Drydocks provided the ideal setting for launching a worker 
participation scheme. The Drydocks was originally a naval dockyard 
base for British warships and was converted into a commercial 
enterprise by the British Colonial Government in 1959. A British 
firm, Bailey & Co., which was granted a loan of £Stg 6 million, 
was appointed to run the Dockyard. Following a dispute between 
the Colonial office and the firm about the utilisation of funds, the 
Drydocks was offered to another firm, Swan Hunter. In 1968 the 
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Malta Drydocks Act was passed in Parliament through which the 
Maltese Government became the sole proprietor of the Yard (Malta 
Drydocks Act 1968). 
The General Workers' Union (GWU) had represented the 
Drydocks workers in its tough negotiations with the Admiralty, 
who had been an employer with no commercial interests. It had 
thus managed to obtain relatively high wages and good conditions 
of work for the Drydocks workers. It was feared that, since the 
Drydocks was now being run on commercial lines, the GWU would 
no longer be able obtain such good deals. Nevertheless, the GWU 
was in no mood to compromise. "Right from the start, management 
found a hostile and dissatisfied labour force" (Kester, 1980, p. 43). 
This hostility showed no sign of abatement after 1968. The strife 
that ensued between labour and management due to this hostility 
very often resulted in industrial actions. Prior to the 1971 election, 
the Drydocks workers engaged in a dragging seven- month partial 
industrial action that brought the whole enterprise to a virtual 
standstill. The dispute was about the adjustment of the wages of 
the industrial workers to bring them in line with those of the non-
industrials who had been granted an increase in their salary 
following the signing of a collective agreement. The Malta Labour 
Party (MLP), then in opposition, promised that, once elected, it 
would try to find a new solution to such perennial conflictual 
relations. Indeed, soon after assuming office after the June 1971 
election victory, the Labour Government set up a Board of Directors 
made up of three officials of the trade union representing the 
workers at the Dockyard (the GWU) and three members appointed 
by Government. The chairperson was to be appointed by 
Government but, in the choice of George Agius, the chair was 
acceptable to both sides. The industrial peace ushered in by this 
system enabled the Drydocks to attain a profitable trading position 
for the first time in its history in 1973-74. The prospect of a viable 
economic Drydocks induced the Government to translate its 
socialist principles into action by making the Drydocks a self 
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managed firm. In other words, the control of the enterprise was to 
be transferred to a board elected directly by the workers. The Malta 
Dockyard Act (1968) was amended accordingly. By adopting this 
policy the Government felt that it was laying the foundations for 
a new form of labour relations. Malta Drydocks was to act as a 
model to demonstrate that there is a different way of managing a 
firm. 
Meanwhile the Government explicitly stated that it had no 
intention of interfering in the affairs of the private sector (Kester, 
1980, p. 119). Rather than providing a legal framework binding 
the private sector to introduce workers' participation the 
Government preferred to adopt a two-pronged approach in order 
to put into practice the principles of industrial democracy. One 
approach was the setting up of workers' committees in all the 
departments of the public service, which were to act as strategic 
instruments for the transformation of power. The other was a state 
initiative to introduce the principles of worker's participation in 
the management of those enterprises where the state had a 
controlling interest. Once these firms become economically viable, 
they were to be run on a self-management basis. 
Thus, by the end of the 1970's, almost "one third of all wage and 
salaried earners" were enjoying some form of participation at their 
place of work (ibid., p. 155). This new scenario was supposed to do 
away with the 'us-them' dichotomy and render industrial relations 
more peaceful. Malta Drydocks was offering an alternative way of 
how a firm could be run and was to act as a model for other 
enterprises to follow. The Government felt that it had laid a solid 
foundation for the growth and expansion of a completely different 
form of industrial relations based on collaboration and trust rather 
than on suspicion and conflict. Government was hopeful that an 
enhancement of participatory experiences could bring about 
structural change in the economy and in the national culture that 
would make the desirable but painful road towards self-reliance 
much smoother (Development Plan 1973-1980). The course of 
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events, however, did not help to transform such hopes into reality. 
The actual events that unfolded did not only stall the 
participatory scheme but reversed the whole process in the three 
areas where the Government tried to launch its workers' 
participation project - namely departments in the public sector, 
state-run or controlled industries and Malta Drydocks. Why did 
these attempts fail? What follows is an informed and critical answer 
to this crucial question, based on direct references to these three 
expenences of workers' participation with the advantage of 
hindsight. 
Workers' Committees in Government Departments 
In 1977, Government launched a programme to set up workers' 
committees in every Government department in order to give a 
new impetus to workers' participation. According to the 
Regulations of Workers' Committees (1978) these were to serve 
as advisory bodies composed of directly elected workers' 
representatives. Their brief was: 
" ... to give advice on matters which will improve the position 
of the worker at his [sic} place of work and to give advice to 
the Minister responsible for their organisation, when long 
term or short term plans, and financial or physical programmes 
are being discussed and/or prepared" (Regulations of Workers' 
Committees, 1978). 
These Committees were defined "as a necessary tool to develop 
their [workers'} potential and personality" and the best means "to 
increase the dignity of the worker and to avoid hardships while 
increasing efficiency" (ibid.). By the beginning of 1979, there were 
63 workers' committees in the public sector. Moreover, in the 
Education Department, school management committees were set 
up in 11 schools to act as a testing ground for the further 
development of such worker participation. In spite of these positive 
signs, however, this venture failed to mature and achieve any of its 
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objectives. 
Why did this happen? These workers' committees were 
introduced at a time when Government had a long drawn out 
dispute with the Confederation of Malta Trade Unions (CMTU). 
The CMTU mainly represented non-manual workers such as civil 
servants, teachers, bank employees, nurses and other related staff 
workers. Meanwhile, the largest Maltese trade union, the General 
Workers' Union (GWU), did not form part of this Confederation. 
In these tense circumstances, rather than lending support to the 
CMTU-affiliated unions, the GWU aligned solidly itself with 
Government. This intensified polarisation on the political front as 
each of these two trade union movements, each backed by one of 
main two political parties on the island, started hurling accusations 
at each other. Elections to the workers' committees, used by each 
trade union as a test of its strength at the place of work, were soon 
rendered contests of partisan loyalty and support. 
The way each trade union mobilised its members - advising 
them to resort to block voting created a tense atmosphere. The 
coverage given in the press to these elections, especially by 
newspapers which acted as organs of political parties, added fuel 
to this tension. Rather than engendering mutual ttust, these 
workers' committees ended up giving rise to deep-seated suspicions 
between public sector employees and senior Government officials. 
The trade unions in dispute with Government suspected that these 
committees were being used as a tool to circumvent potential strike 
action. On the other hand, Government accused these unions that 
they were using these committees for their self-aggrandisement 
rather than to enhance participation. Once their term of office 
expired in 1979-1980, no fresh elections for workers committees 
were held. There was never any outcry from either side for their 
resuscitation. The scheme seemed to have been scuppered at the 
outset. 
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Parastatal and Peoples' Industries 
The participation by the State in the labour market along with 
the private sector was considered by the Malta Labour Party (MLP), 
then in office, to be one of the tenets of a healthy, mixed economy. 
The Malta Development Corporation (MDC), whose original aim 
was to promote investment in industry, became a stakeholder. Most 
of the industries that it fully or pardy owned, were rescue cases of 
industries in difficulty. By the beginning of 1978, the MDC owned 
nine enterprises and had a majority shareholding in another ten. 
In its bid to disseminate industrial democracy the Government 
turned to these industries, now defined as Parastatal and People's 
Industries (PPI), to experiment with workers' participation. A 
Ministry specifically established for this industrial sector was 
assigned the task of making this system economically viable and 
introducing workers' participation. 
A directive from the Prime Minister obliged these industries to 
appoint a management committee and a workers' committee. The 
former was to be made up of managers and workers whereas the 
latter was to consist exclusively of workers. The workers were also 
given the right to elect a representative on the Board of Directors. 
The idea was to create a cluster of firms in the manufacturing 
sector that were to be run differently from the conventional 
management style. 
However, the rationale of the manufacturing sector, unlike that 
of the public sector, is to maximise profit. The success of a 
manufacturing firm very often depends on its professional 
management, its technical expertise and market know-how. The 
Parastatal and Peoples' Industries (PPIs), most of them taken over 
by the MDC to rescue them from bankruptcy, seemed to be lacking 
on all these counts. In order to upgrade their economic performance 
and profitability the Government sought partners for joint ventures 
from Europe and the U.S.A. (Kester, 1980, p. 188). It was 
regrettably concluded that, if workers committees would prove to 
be a stumbling block for negotiation of a joint venture agreement, 
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they would have to be disbanded. The dream of creating a niche in 
the manufacturing sector tun by workers was becoming difficult 
to actuate. The whole PPI structure was reassessed and eventually 
its Ministry was discontinued and became part of the Ministry of 
Industry. The ideals of workers' participation had to give way to 
the pragmatic dictates and constraints of the economic market. 
Technocracy had to prevail over democracy (Zammit & 
Baldacchino, 1988, p. 4). 
Nevertheless, the winding up of the workers' committees did 
not bring about the termination of workers' representatives on the 
boards of the Parastatal and People's Industries. In some of these, 
the worker director on the board was retained l . With the exception 
of Malta Shipbuilding, all these worker directors were usually 
appointed upon nomination by the trade union, which in all cases 
was the GWU (Zammit & Baldacchino, 1988, p. 5). The fact that 
there was no legal provision for the workers representative to sit 
on the board of Directors was to lead to an open confrontation 
between the GWU and Government. 
After the May 1987 election, won by the Nationalist Party (NP), 
the new composition of the Board of Ene malta Corporation, a state 
owned electricity, gas and oil supply organisation, did not include 
a worker director. The GWU protested vigorously and even filed 
a judicial protest in the Civil Court claiming that this omission 
was a breach of the collective agreement. The Government replied 
in a counter statement that the law gave it vested powers to 
nominate the Corporation's board. The Government even refused 
to appoint the GWU nominee on the Board of Telemalta 
Corporation, a state owned broadcasting and communications 
company. 
1 A worker director /l'as retained on the boards of Bank 0/ Valletta: Tefelllafta; Enemalttt: 
Magmlfision: Mttrsa Shipbllilding: COJlStmction & General Engineering: Tllg Alttl!CI & Air 
lHal!CI. See Zammit & BafdClcchino, 1988. (See Cllso Appendix) 
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Still, Government informed the GWU that it was willing to 
have a worker director on the board of these two corporations, as 
long as the workers' representative was elected by the employees. 
Following protracted negotiations between the union and 
Government, it was agreed to revise the legislation regulating the 
election of worker directors on the boards of these two parastatal 
corporations. Experience has so far shown that a worker needs the 
support of the union in order to be elected as a director representing 
the workers. Indeed, the elected workers directors have generally 
been trade union activists. Their election is heavily influenced by 
the block vote of the specific union membership. 
In 1988, a federation of worker directors was set up. One of its 
aims was "to assist workers in enterprises where there is as yet no 
worker director, so that these workers will also have their 
representative on the board" (Statute of Worker Directors, Article 
3d). Rather than pursuing this aim, the federation seemed to be 
more intent on combating the forces it perceived to be threatening 
the system and principles of workers' participation. Although 
workers representation on the board of directors survived as a form 
of workers participation, the number of worker directors did not 
Increase. 
An attempt was made in 1997 to increase the number of worker 
directors. Following the re-election of the Labour Party to office 
in 1996, the then Minister of Economic Affairs expressed the 
intention of the new Government of appointing more worker 
directors on Government owned enterprises. This Minister 
appointed a Consultative Committee to devise a code of practice 
for worker directors (Rizzo, 1997). The code, submitted in 1997, 
has not been given any formal endorsement and remains shelved. 
In 1999, following the take over of Mid-Med Bank (where the 
state had majority share holding) by HSBC, no worker director 
was appointed on the new board. 
In comparison with these corporations the Drydocks, run by a 
board of nine directors all elected by the workers, appeared to be 
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an inimitable case of workers participation. However the turn of 
events towards the end of the 20th century were to make the system 
of workers' participation in this enterprise similar to that of the 
parastatal and public corporations. 
Malta Drydocks 
The Drydocks was supposed to act as a model of a viable enterprise 
tun on democratic lines. The early phase of its participatory 
experience was promising. During the financial year 1973174, two 
years after the introduction of the co-determination system, it 
managed to register a profit for the first time in its history as a 
commercial enterprise. Though this profit was a modest one it 
was considered to be a remarkable achievement since in the previous 
years when it was managed by two British firms it had registered 
hefty losses. Following this success, the emboldened Maltese 
Government decided to pass on the Drydocks to the workers. The 
affairs and business of the Drydocks were to be conducted by a 
council which: 
" ... shall consist of nine members of which eight shall be 
elected by the employees of the corporation in manner 
provided by this Act, and the other member, who shall be 
the chairman, shall be appointed by elected members 
(Drydocks Amendment Act 1975, Article 3). 
In 1978, industrial democracy was further extended by the setting 
up of workers' committees in each of the eighteen departments of 
the Drydocks. These workers' committees were to act as a liaison 
between council members and workers and to help the respective 
Departmental managers in the coordination of work. This move 
together with the highest profit ever recorded (Lm 1,333,312) in 
1981 seemed to have consolidated the self-management system at 
the Yard. A staggering 88% of the workers polled in a sample 
survey in 1982 expressed their general support for the participatory 
system (Baldacchino, 1984). In elections held to elect the Drydocks 
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Council, there was a consistently high turn out. 
But things soon took a turn for the worse. In 1982, the Drydocks 
plunged again into loss. The losses became chronic and reached a 
hefty Lm 12,516,000 in 1995. The enterprise had to rely on heavy 
state subsidies to survive throughout these years. The justification 
or otherwise for such transfers became one of the main topics of 
the media debate. The detractors of workers' participation focussed 
on the political overtones of the self-management system at the 
Yard, which, they maintained, were precluding the firm from 
operating on sound principles of cost effectiveness and efficiency. 
They further argued that, once the Drydocks had become dependent 
on state subsidies for its survival, it had become a burden to the 
Maltese taxpayer. 
In 1989, in an agreement signed between the Nationalist 
Government and the Drydocks Council, a generous sum of money 
was assigned to the enterprise to restructure and become viable 
within ten years. However as this 10-year period was nearing its 
end, there seemed to be no signs of recovery as the losses continued 
to accumulate. In 1996 the newly elected Labour Government 
commissioned two reports - one on the financial situation and the 
other on the management system of the enterprise (Cassar White, 
1996; Baldacchino, 1997). The damning and adverse comments 
made by each of these two reports on the management system at 
the Drydocks prompted the Government to take drastic action. 
Subsequently, in 1997 the Government moved the amendment 
to the Drydocks Act by means of which the Council of the Yard 
was to be formed by four members appointed by Government, 
four members elected by the workers and a chairperson appointed 
by Government. In 2000, in an agreement signed by the General 
Workers' Union (GWU) representing the workers at the Drydocks 
and the new Government (the Nationalist Party, back in power 
after a snap election in 1998), it was decided that there would be 
only one workers' representative on the Drydocks Council. The 
rest of the Council members were to be appointed by Government. 
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The reversal of the self-management system, which sounded the 
death knell of the dream of workers' participation, can be attributed 
to factors external to the Yard as well as internal. The losses incurred 
by the Drydocks can be attributed mainly to the international 
market, which in the ship-repair industry has for long been 
characterised by over-capacity and high competitive pricing for 
work. Even in 1959 when the colonial government offered the 
running of the yard to several large British firms none showed any 
interest. Bailey and Co. (who eventually took over) was a relatively 
modest firm by British standards. Thus the Drydocks Council, 
made entirely of workers elected by their fellows, undertook the 
daunting task which reputable British firms were reluctant to 
assume. So workers' participation cannot be entirely blamed for 
the lack of profitability of Malta Drydocks. 
However the internal factors at the Yard militated against 
efficiency and good management. The worker committees set up 
in 1978 usurped the role of the shop steward and the Department 
manager. Rather than helping management in its coordination 
task, they tried to take over from management so that a 'cold war' 
ensued between management and the worker committee members. 
(Baldacchino, 1997, p. 14). In order to enhance their popularity 
with their fellow workers elected Council members tended to side 
more with the latter than the former. Professional managers felt 
that they were being bypassed, overruled, disarmed and 
dishonoured (ibid., p. 21). 
It seemed that the power gained by workers was being used more 
to further their self-interest rather than the well-being of the firm. 
Indeed, resorting to overtime had, in 1995, constituted 30.8 % of 
the total labour costs: an unacceptably high figure. Management 
prerogative on this issue had been taken over by trade union 
officials, who set up a roster system to distribute overtime equally 
among workers. This resulted in unnecessary hours of overtime. 
Due to trade union power and practice, the firm's labour costs 
were relatively high, and becoming higher, in relation to many 
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other shipyards in Europe. 
Thus, the self-management system at the Drydocks did not help 
to mitigate the 'us-them' dichotomy between workers and 
managers. The power gained by the workers was at the expense of 
the managers who, on seeing their authority being heavily 
undermined, became indifferent or left the Dockyard in search of 
alternative employment. Furthermore, the system did not render 
the firm more cost effective. Those who had been championing 
the cause of workers' participation felt disarmed at the arguments 
propounded by the system's detractors. 
Following the publication of the two reports on the situation at 
Malta Drydocks, the editorial of a local newspaper highlighted 
the precarious financial situation at the Dockyard and its ineffective 
managerial system. It stated that "the experiment has cost the 
nation dearly" (The Times, 19th February 1997). In another local 
English weekly newspaper, a correspondent lambasted "the myths 
of workers' participation" and stated that "workers' participation 
has failed as much as communism and extreme forms of right and 
left wing socialism" (Malta Business Weekly, 13-19 February 1997). 
Conclusion 
From the vantage point of the present, Maltese experiences of 
workers' participation over the last 30 years have been a string of 
abortions and miscarriages. Promoting a gradual and flexible 
solution to practical issues was considered to be the most pragmatic 
approach towards instilling an ideology of workers' participation. 
Implicitly, it was believed that a pragmatic strategy of participation 
devoid of ideology would make it less susceptible to criticism. 
However, this approach did not manage to overcome the lags 
inherent in a culture of powerlessness and low self-esteem bred 
through years of colonial rule. Many Maltese realised that one way 
to beat this subjugation was to turn to social networking. Once 
the resourcefulness of the Maltese was directed towards building 
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alliances and seeking opportunities through which they could gain 
advantageous positions, clientelism and patronage became rife. 
Workers' participation might have been perceived by some to be 
one of these means and opportunities. There seems to be tangible 
evidence, at least from the Drydocks experience, that support for 
workers' participation sprang out more from personal interest than 
from ideology. Excessive self-interest may have seriously impaired 
the growth and development of such an innovative experience of 
workers' participation. 
To add to this cultural lag, the political climate was not conducive 
to the promotion of workers' participation. Although Malta has 
been spared the internecine conflicts originating from religion and 
ethnicity, divisions among the Maltese exist. In an island 
microstate, these divisions tend to "sharpen because of the pervasive 
and more emotional nature of relationships in a small society" 
(Richards, 1982, p. 160). These sharp divisions are clearly manifest 
in the political field, giving rise to heated rivalry between 
supporters of the two main political parties, which in the post war 
period have been jostling for power. The difference between these 
two parties amounts to a few thousand votes. This has sparked a 
high level of polarisation in politics where any issue easily develops 
into a major confrontation. In such a scenario, it is often difficult 
to distinguish between a social, interpersonal or political issue. 
Workers' participation was not spared from this open 
confrontation. Inter-trade union rivalry, which is often viewed as a 
re-enactment of the polarisation on the political front, was one of 
the factors that led to the demise of workers' committees in the 
public sector. In both the Parastatal and People's Industries and 
the Drydocks, such a climate did not prevail since the workers in 
these enterprises belonged largely to just one trade union, the 
General Workers' Union (GWU) which was an ally of the political 
party, the Malta Labour Party, then in office. Yet, this support of 
the GWU towards the system was interpreted as an attempt to 
justify its collaboration with the Labour Government, rather than 
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induced by a strong inherent belief in the system. 
It must also be stated that the Labour Government's zeal for 
reform was being viewed by a large section of the Maltese as a plan 
to uproot the traditional Maltese values and infringe upon the 
authority of such institutions as the Catholic Church. Workers' 
participation might have therefore been perceived as part of a 
package of communist-inspired reforms based on Marxist dogma. 
The situation at Malta Drydocks did not help to dispel such notions. 
Rather than serving as a model of workers' participation, the 
Drydocks was seen as a subsidy-addicted enterprise annually 
draining the Maltese coffers of millions of liri. The continuous 
sponsoring by the State of workers, whose militancy and 
belligerence were not savoured by a large section of the Maltese, 
was seen as a political game seeking to secure industrial peace. 
Thus, in spite of the initial euphoria of the seventies, workers' 
participation failed to maintain the upsurge in interest. The high-
trust relationship, which it sought to establish, failed to materialise 
both at the Drydocks and in the public sector. Perhaps the 
piecemeal and haphazard way in which it was introduced was its 
own undoing. There were no structured and sustained educational 
programmes to make workers and managers aware of the 
responsibilities of worker participation. The way each side, driven 
by the self interest of its individuals, tried to manipulate the system 
to its own advantage made workers' participation look more like a 
blatant struggle for power than as a tool to enhance the dignity of 
work. Gerard Kester, international expert on the implementation 
of industrial democracy, had this to say to an audience of worker 
leaders from Malta Drydocks in 1995: 
"The real challenge is to make an economically viable system; 
to make sure that salaries are the fruit of the performance of 
the enterprise itself and not a function of a political game. 
The political game is a very dangerous frame of reference; 
that game may suddenly have other rules and then you could 
be the loser" (Rizzo, 1996, p. 53). 
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Of course, the system has also to be analysed in the context of 
the economic constraints of a small, resource-poor island state 
heavily dependent on foreign investment. The Labour Government 
directed its policy of workers' participation in those areas which 
were not likely to cause any flight of capital. When forms of 
workers' participation were deemed to offer obstacles to foreign 
direct investment, they were summarily discontinued. The 
Drydocks was a unique case. Had this commercial enterprise, which 
is socially owned, demonstrated that workers' participation is 
conducive to higher productivity and a sounder financial position, 
then the case for workers' participation would have been stronger. 
This demonstration effect was not forthcoming. The self-
management system in this enterprise did not prove to be dynamic 
enough to deal in a forceful and effective way with the vagaries of 
the market. With a lack of vision and maybe shorn of the will to 
tackle the serious problems threatening its economic viability, along 
with a sidelined and demotivated management team, the Drydocks 
Council continued to recycle the same old ideas rather than taking 
initiatives to innovate and branch our in other areas as it had been 
advised to do. When in 1980 a reform committee was set up by 
the Prime Minister to offset anticipated losses, there was a strong 
reaction from workers. This reform committee was eventually 
wound up and its function of devising schemes towards greater 
productivity was entrusted to Council members. However, these 
members were not keen on taking unpopular measures; being more 
intent on maintaining their popularity so as not to jeopardise their 
prospects for re-election. These reactions and practices did not help 
to boost the financial position of the enterprise; nor did they boost 
the credibility of self-management. 
Thus, few tears were shed when this self-management system, 
which had been in operation in Malta Drydocks for 22 years (1975-
1997), was dismantled. 
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End or Beginning? 
Is this the definitive end of a saga? In recent years, we have been 
witnessing a new upsurge of worker participatory initiatives, this 
time promoted and supported by the social policy acquis of the 
European Union at a regional level and by human resource 
management practices at enterprise level. The declared intentions 
of removing the 'us-them' attitude and maintaining industrial 
peace are now also accompanied by attempts to allow workers to 
involve themselves in the running of their organisations and thus 
contribute more fully and in a more committed way, to their 
performance and competitiveness. Such initiatives are now driven 
by management. Trade unions find themselves wary, suspicious 
and even cynical in relation to such a reversal of roles. A critical 
assessment of these new initiatives in worker participation within 
the Maltese economy is certainly timely. 
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